

## THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN TO THE US SUMMARY

The strategic importance of Spain hinges on two

main factors: the political orientation of the Spanish

Government, ~~and~~ the military balance of power on the

Continent. <sup>and</sup> Only so long as the Spanish Government is

anti-Communist, ~~and~~ so long as the Soviet armed forces

are capable of rapidly over-running Germany, France,

and the Benelux countries, <sup>and only</sup> Potentially  
will Spain possess/great

strategic importance for the US. As the military

strength of the West increases in relation to Soviet

military capabilities, the strategic importance of Spain

will decline. Moreover, Spain's geography has strategic

disadvantages as well as advantages. Spain constitutes ~~etc~~

Note: This estimate is in process of coordination with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. It contains information available to CIA as of 1 October 1950.

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## THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN TO THE US

The strategic importance of Spain to the US <sup>hinges on two main</sup> ~~is dependent upon~~

factors: (1) the balance of military power in the Continent of Europe; and upon the overall military situation in western Europe, provided that

(2) the existence of an anti-Communist government ~~in power~~ in Spain. ~~However,~~

~~Spain's strategic importance to the US is potentially great~~

~~only as long as the Spanish Government is anti-Communist and the Soviet and~~ Germany, France, and the Benelux countries can be

~~will Spain possess great strategic importance potentially for the US.~~ As the military strength of

the West increases in relation to Soviet military capabilities, the

Moreover, Spain's geography has strategic disadvantages. ~~Geographically~~ Spain's strategic importance will decline.

~~contributes~~ a base from which it is possible to dominate the air and

sea routes from the UK and the European Atlantic states to South

America, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Defensively, it would be

possible to delay a land invader of Spain at the Pyrenees, <sup>although</sup> It is,

~~however~~ noteworthy that never in its history has Spain repelled an

invasion in these high mountains. Spain can offer an ally valuable

harbors, ~~and~~ naval and air bases. The rugged terrain of the country--

useful in some respects to defenders of Spain--also presents dis-

advantages which are <sup>heightened</sup> compounded by the inadequate and seriously run-

down transportation system.

In case of a general war, on the assumption that Soviet and Satellite

forces would be capable of overrunning Western Europe, <sup>it would be</sup> ~~a condition of~~

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necessary to deny Spain to the enemy in order to defend other Mediterranean positions.

Politically the Spanish Government and people are strongly anti-Communist,

The Government will not voluntarily collaborate in multilateral arrangements for Western European defense. However, it will treat its possible contributions to this defense as trading assets, and will demand a substantial, but at present unpredictable, quid pro quo. Part of the "price" would certainly be substantial capital imports and consumption goods. Franco might attempt to have Gibraltar returned to Spain and Tangier's status revised in Spain's favor.

~~extension of US unilateral aid.~~  
For the US to extend aid unilaterally to the Franco regime would produce a very unfavorable public reaction elsewhere in Western Europe and in Latin America. Indications that the US had decided to utilize the strategic advantages of Spain's position would immediately cast doubt upon the sincerity of announced US intention to defend Western Europe on a line east of the Rhine. In order to utilize Spanish manpower in the defense effort, the US would have to bear virtually the entire cost of re-equipping the Spanish Army, Navy, and Air Force, and of providing them with logistical support. This probably would cost the US one to two billion dollars. Franco, moreover, would not willingly

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commit his forces outside Spanish national territory. The special status of the Spanish Army as the dominating political force in Spain makes it doubtful that the Spanish Government would ever consent to placing it under a unified European command.

The Spanish armed forces presently number 490,000 with 1,300,000 trained reserves. The Spanish Navy could perform useful patrol and convoy functions; on the other hand, the Army, poorly trained and equipped, has negligible capabilities, and the Air Force is worthless.

Economically, Spain is currently able to furnish an ally nothing more than a few critical materials (especially pyrites and wolfram).

It would be of value to US security, and probably would be feasible at this time, to deny Spain's production of strategic materials to the USSR.

Any effort to derive an economic contribution from Spain would call for a very substantial US aid program that would have to be extensive within each sector of the Spanish economy. A complete rehabilitation of the economy would be necessary--"priming" is not possible. A program of this kind would take at least four years before returns could be expected.

Economic rehabilitation of Spain in order to overcome the major logistic liabilities present, would cost the US one to two billion

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dollars (apart from military equipment costs) and would require four years or more at the estimated peace time rate of progress which could be made.

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## THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN TO THE US

I. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORSA. General.

*to the US is*  
 The strategic importance of Spain derived primarily from its geographic location. So long as it remains within the capabilities of Soviet and Satellite forces to overrun Western Germany, the Benelux countries and France, in case of a general war, the US ~~must be able~~  
*depends on denying*  
~~the Iberian peninsula to the enemy, in order to assure its~~  
~~the prospect~~ of supporting and holding positions in the Mediterranean.

The Iberian Peninsula dominates the Western Mediterranean and the Straits of Gibraltar. Control of Spanish Morocco, lying across the Straits, augments the geographic strength of this position. A military power controlling peninsular Spain would be in a position to harass or deny normal sea and air lanes between Europe and Africa, and Europe and South America. The possibility of preventing a strong continental power from extending its control to Spain depends <sup>on it</sup> for the defensibility of the Pyrenees Mountains barrier at the French-Spanish frontier. Geographically Spain is potentially next in importance to the British Isles as a base for preventing the creation of a totalitarian "fortress Europa". Enemy occupation of either the British Isles or Spain would affect adversely US capabilities of projecting military power across the North Atlantic.

B. Terrain.

Iberia, which includes Spain and Portugal, has an elevation averaging

2,000 feet.

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See map

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Rugged mountains border the central plateau except on the west.

Generally Relief features restrict vehicular movement, except locally.

However, conditions are favorable for employment of mechanized equipment along the interrupted coastal lowlands, in the Ebro Basin and on the Meseta and Andalusian plains. Much of the peninsula is well-suited to guerrilla tactics, which would be facilitated by the poor transportation net. There is a wide seasonal fluctuation on all streams; highwater stage runs from January to March; ~~and~~ low water, from July to September. The nature of the stream banks and beds normally impedes movement far more than do widths and depths. Except in the north, water supply is a critical problem, particularly during summer and autumn. Surface conditions are most favorable for ground operations from early May until late September, when the ground is dry and firm, but dusty, especially during the latter part of the period. Conditions are poorest for operations, particularly in the north, ~~between~~ <sup>from</sup> December <sup>to</sup> ~~and~~ March, inclusive, because of wet ground, swollen streams, and snow cover of varying duration and depth. (For more detailed treatment see Appendix A, SR-11 (~~CIA/REF~~) published 15 November 1948.)

Few good landing areas along the coast are available to an invader. Possible land approaches are confined to narrow coastal

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corridors at the extremities of the Pyrenees and to a few narrow mountain passes where terrain greatly favors defense.

The French-Spanish boundary follows the main watershed of the Pyrenees mountains stretching between the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, a distance of 421 miles (667 ~~km~~<sup>km</sup>). These mountains form a barrier which, although remarkably complete in the central area, is easily evaded both by land and sea at the eastern and western edges. In the east the plains of Roussillon to the north, and Ampurdan to the south, are separated only by the low Alberes range through which the pass of Le Perthus, 15 miles inland, lies at 997 feet. The western edge is less accessible, with its heavier forest cover and more complex foothills, but the famous Roncesvalles pass and the coastal route provide relatively easy through passages. Between these peripheral regions the main ranges of the Pyrenees minimize movement between the two countries; from the Pico de Anie to Canigou the mountains rise from 8,000 to 11,000 feet, and since the passes lie <sup>at</sup> about 5,000 feet they are usually covered with snow from November to May. About three-fourths of the total area of the Pyrenees lies on the Spanish side of the boundary. The width and complexity of the ranges hinder road construction, which has been much less well-developed on the Spanish than on the French slopes. Only ten of the through passes are used

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by main routes. Secondary roads or mountain trails in 16 passes provide alternatives to the principal highways and serve the country between them. The routes across the high ranges are controlled far to the south by a series of key towns, including, from east to west,

Gerona, Vich, Lerida, Huesca, Jaca, Pamplona, and Irun. ~~It is only~~

Communication with the rest of the Spanish road system or between many of the Pyrenean valleys can only be established by descending to these towns.

*70-100 ft* *The* *generally*  
~~system.~~ Most roads in the Pyrenees, although well constructed, ~~are~~  
 and most of them are  
 in a poor state of repair, and vary greatly in width and type of  
 surface. Zigzag bends, curves and narrow bridges are common. ~~The~~

*is* *incomplete; when one of* *there is usually*  
~~main difficulty, however, is the incompleteness of the road system. Moreover,~~  
 so that the through roads ~~are~~ blocked or impassable, ~~there are~~ *usually*  
~~no alternative routes to follow.~~ *is*  
~~alternatives.~~ There is no complete east-west route to parallel the

Route des Pyrenees on the French side.

Despite the defensive potential of the Pyrenees, ~~historically~~

*it is* *important* *no* *leave* *in*  
 this barrier has been penetrated by many invaders, and Spain has never repelled an important invasion by mounting a unified resistance based on the Pyrenees defense line. These mountains, on the other hand, protected the French from invasion through Spain during the wave of Moorish conquest.

*No they*  
*didn't*

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C. ← C. Spain as a Base of Operations Spain's geographic location

would permit well equipped forces based there to dominate the air and

sea routes from Great Britain and the Atlantic European countries to

South America, Africa, and the Mediterranean. The nature of the terrain

would greatly facilitate defense against a land attack, *and there are few* ~~while the relative~~

~~lack of landing areas along the Spanish coast would make an attack from~~ *suitable for large-scale*

*Assault landings.*

~~the sea difficult.~~ However, Spain's rugged terrain also constitutes a

weakness, since overland transport ~~not only~~ would be impeded by natural

*and* barriers, ~~but~~ would be extremely vulnerable to air attack and sabotage.

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## II. POLITICAL FACTORS

### A. The Franco Regime

Spain, under the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde, is a totalitarian and anti-democratic state, strongly influenced in its governmental structure, its system of internal controls, and its economic policies by the principles of fascism. Despite Franco's repeated assurances that "evolution" toward a more liberal system was contemplated, no effective advance has been made in that direction. No change is to be expected while Franco's personal power lasts. He has the support of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy, of an influential minority of bankers, industrialists, and landowners and of the Falange Party and the bureaucracy it has created. Ultimately, he holds office at the pleasure of the Army. Franco was established as Chief of State in 1939 by a Junta of Generals after the Army had attained the physical and political mastery of the nation through the Civil War.

Since that time the Franco regime has maintained internal order, although resorting partly to Gestapo methods to do so. Franco has suffocated the domestic Communist movement, although at the same time he has suppressed even the moderate Monarchist opposition together with the non-Communist leftist, liberal, and free labor organizations. The belief that these measures would provide security --

after the fears aroused by parliamentary confusion during the Republic

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and by the acts of destruction and terrorism perpetrated by both sides during the Civil War --have offset the shortcomings of the regime in the eyes of many Spaniards.

Precisely because the dictatorship appeared to be a guarantee of political stability, Franco at the outset had the confidence of a broad range of Spanish society. He failed, however, to utilize his strong position to advance the welfare of the nation as a whole. His policy has been largely dominated by a spirit of vengeance against those who opposed him in the Civil War. Thus a very large part of the Spanish public still exists under adverse and repressive conditions, while some half <sup>14</sup> million Spaniards remain in exile. Special sectors of society, certain corporative and institutional interests, and the military class, on the other hand, have enjoyed immense benefits under these policies. The status of the Spanish people in general, however, has deteriorated, socially and economically, <sup>un</sup>by comparison with the conditions which existed before the Civil War. The Franco regime is now unpopular with a great majority of the people in all parts of the country. Franco is bureaucratically insulated from accurate knowledge of the situation, and he is apparently incapable of liberalizing policies

\* According to official Spanish statistics, the per capita income - in pesetas of 1929 value - has dropped from 1,033 in 1935 to 878 in 1948 and 848 pesetas in 1949; it is estimated that the real income of the urban worker is only 50 percent of the 1935 level.

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or of relinquishing power voluntarily. He will not be forced out of power, however, so long as he continues to have the support of the generals, in view of the political inertia which has overtaken the middle and labor classes as the result of economic privation and police repression, and the fear of change among the privileged classes. The latter anticipate a wave of vengeance and reprisals should the regime relax its controls, and on general principles would like to preserve the Falange system of

labor domination. *See insert* The Franco regime is thus superficially stable, although it rests upon an insecure foundation.

Communist capabilities of infiltrating Spain or revitalizing the Communist guerrilla units are negligible at present. The Spanish Communist Party has lost prestige and cohesiveness to a marked degree during the last two years, and the expulsion ~~from~~ of the central group of Spanish Communist militants from their asylum in France will carry this disintegration further. Because of the general opposition to Communism among all classes and political groups, there is very little possibility of the Communists overthrowing the government or obtaining control of the government through other means.

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B. Western European Attitudes toward Spain

The character of the Franco regime and its pro-Fascist, pro-Nazi orientation before and during World War II have made Spain a pariah among the Western European countries. Although Franco succeeded in maintaining through World War II a precarious opportunistic neutrality, Spain has since then remained isolated from the other Western European powers. It has not been admitted to the UN, OEEC, NATO and MDAP and presently has no prospect of being admitted.

Franco's extreme anti-Communism does not outweigh the repugnance widely felt toward his regime. To be sure, some elements among the conservative and military circles in the other Western European countries favor taking Franco in as he is, simply as a practical matter of mobilizing Spain's strategic assets in the general opposition

to the USSR. *But from the point of view of the* ~~The Western European governments, however, on the broad~~

~~that~~ a rapprochement with Franco under present

*be politically disadvantageous and would have* ~~conditions would raise political liabilities while giving a~~

*few* compensating advantages. They

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held to this opinion regarding OEEC and reaffirmed it regarding the

NATO. With the exception of Portugal, all of the other Western

European governments continue opposed to the inclusion of Spain in

MDAP. On the military side, ~~however~~, <sup>the</sup> ~~their~~ primary concern <sup>of the Western European</sup> is to <sup>government</sup>

establish the first lines of European defense as far to the north

and east as possible, ~~and not on the Pyrenees except as an ultimate~~

~~assert~~. Any extraordinary move to incorporate Spain into defense

plans now would jeopardize their efforts to obtain adequate public

support for the sacrifices the defense plans entail. <sup>See insert</sup> Portugal's

insistence on bringing in Spain will not alter the attitude of the

other NATO countries. It is a unilateral effort, arising partly

out of Portugal's desire to increase its own security by having a

stronger Spain at its back and partly out of the demands of the

Spaniards on the basis of obligations under the Spanish-Portuguese

Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression.

<sup>Substrate attached</sup> ~~while~~ <sup>(The current UN session has revoked)</sup> revocation of the two operative clauses of the 1946 General

Assembly resolution, which recommended the recall of Chiefs of Mission

and Spain's exclusion from specialized agencies, <sup>is</sup> expected in the

<sup>full</sup> ~~current~~ UN session, <sup>in</sup> this improvement of Spain's diplomatic relations

with the Western European countries will not alter the situation

regarding defense arrangements.

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Only the Portuguese Government, who see theory and practice most nearly resemble those of Spain and whose strategic interests are ~~not~~ peculiarly related <sup>to</sup> those of Spain, is in favor of bringing Spain into Atlantic ~~European~~ defense plans, ~~not~~ <sup>Portugal has taken</sup> ~~with~~ <sup>Portugal is not</sup> ~~obliged to~~ <sup>as well as the its own security interests</sup> ~~take~~ this stand on the basis of obligations under the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, but ~~this~~ <sup>its</sup> unilateral effort will not alter the attitude of the other western European governments.

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C. Attitude of the Spanish Government toward Western European Collaboration.

The Franco regime fully reciprocates the dislike of the other Western European governments and wishes to remain dissociated from their common military and economic arrangements, though at the same time it feels acutely the psychological and practical disadvantages of exclusion. Franco is of course fully in accord with the objectives of containing Soviet aggression and eliminating Communist influence in Western Europe.

The Spanish Government, in which the Catholic Church exercises great influence through the presence of its religious advisers at all levels, is opposed to Communism on religious as well as <sup>on</sup> political grounds. The ~~great~~ majority of the people are anti-Communist, including the majority of the leftist and labor opposition groups. Diplomatic relations have never been established between the Franco regime and the Soviet Union, <sup>although</sup> but Spain does not regard its ideological opposition to Communism as a bar to trade. A Spanish government-controlled export-import company, enjoying a monopoly of Spain's trade with the Soviet bloc, has recently been established under the Minister of Industry and Commerce. Exchanges of goods are being arranged through third parties.

However anti-Communist in orientation, the Franco regime will have nothing to do with the concerted defensive efforts of Western Europe,

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insofar as they imply any subordination of nationalism or involve the strengthening of democratic institutions in Western Europe, ~~which Franco opposed.~~

Therefore he has sought to induce the US to grant aid to Spain

unilaterally in recognition of the anti-Communist position of his regime

and the strategic importance of Spain's geographic location. Although

the nominal participation of Spain in Western European regional

arrangements would be gratifying to Franco as a means of ~~writing off~~ <sup>obliterating</sup>

the stigma of international isolation, it would be difficult if not

impossible for him to undertake compliance with the normal obligations

of participating members, inasmuch as ~~this would involve~~ <sup>it is necessary</sup> changes in the

present rigid system of Government controls ~~which~~ <sup>scarcely</sup> could be

made without ~~causing~~ internal political dislocations.

Because of the constant need to satisfy the demands of the large military class which holds the key to Spain's political stability, and because of the severe economic pressures which make it constantly more difficult to do so, Franco finds it particularly desirable to share in the benefits of US military aid for Western Europe. Although excluded from NATO, Franco has hoped that Spain would be brought into US defense plans under a special bilateral arrangement, or that some way for Spain to participate in MDAP benefits could be found with Portugal as an intermediary.

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Franco's attitude toward the US has long been guided by his belief that increasing East-West tension and the danger of a Soviet offensive against Europe would induce the US to receive <sup>him</sup> ~~the dictator~~ as an ally against Communism. Confidence in this possibility increased ~~around~~ Franco after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. This confidence has been disturbed by the <sup>advance of</sup> ~~improving outlook for~~ the US forces in Korea, the restatements of US foreign policy objectives, the growing firmness toward Soviet initiatives in the UN, and the general evidence of increasing will among the Western European countries to coordinate and strengthen their own defense. Franco has reacted by threatening that failure by the US now to reach an amicable understanding with Spain may lead to the refusal of Spain's cooperation if asked later. At the same time, Franco's continuing desire for US acceptance and consequent economic support of Spain as a military ally is shown by unofficial approaches, pressure on Portugal, and the ordering of Spanish naval maneuvers on a scale not previously undertaken in two decades, with the evident purpose of directing attention to the strategic potentialities of Spain's territorial possessions of the Canary Islands and Rio de Oro.

Should the situation develop so as to make feasible <sup>or imperative</sup> the participation of Spain under Franco in the defense program, the price of collaboration would be high. Franco would continue <sup>to seek</sup> ~~seeking~~ US economic and military aid

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free of the obligations <sup>assumed by</sup> ~~incumbent on~~ the participating members of OEEC,  
 NATO and MDAP, and free of the necessity of collaborating with the  
 democratic governments of France and the UK, which Franco and his  
 intimate advisers detest and distrust. ↗

no ff In any case Spain's bargaining position would be based on the fact  
 Franco would make much of the fact that he is anti-Communist  
 of Franco's ~~anti-Communism~~ and on the willingness of the Spanish armed  
 forces to fight on their own soil, if provided with equipment. He would probably not confuse his demands to military aid. It also

is argued by government officials that Spain merits economic  
 indemnification for the diplomatic isolation imposed on the Franco  
 regime. The views of some of Franco's advisers embrace demands for  
 the restoration to Spain of Gibraltar and a revision in Spain's  
 favor of the status of Tangier.

no ff Franco would not willingly commit his forces outside the national  
 territory. Because of the special status of the Spanish Army as the  
 dominating political force in the country, it would be extremely  
 difficult for the Spanish Government to consent to the integration of  
 its military units into a European army under unified command.

to be expected indicated  
 The intransigence of the Spanish Government has been ~~shown~~ by its  
 failure to respond to US suggestions looking toward some sort of economic  
 rapprochement. US gestures have included an invitation, which is still  
 open, to discuss a treaty of friendship and commerce, together with

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repeated assurances that an application to the Export-Import Bank would receive consideration on its merits. After nearly two years, this invitation lacks an official Spanish reply. In the meantime, Spain has made tentative applications to the Bank which have passed over the essential requirement of complete statistical information and have been mainly based on proposals for the expansion of Spain's

government-dominated industrial enterprise, the National Industrial

Institute (INI). Moreover, no ~~concrete~~ <sup>definitive</sup> offers of Spanish collaboration

in Western defense have been made, ~~but~~ many indications have been given

any offer from that the Franco Government ~~considers this a bargaining point~~ <sup>would be made simply for the sake</sup> rather

~~than a question of international cooperation in a spirit of reciprocal~~

~~of bargaining~~ <sup>would</sup> consideration, and that Spain's price ~~will~~ be high.

Many elements in Spain share the intransigent attitude of General

Franco, his refusal to acknowledge any Spanish shortcomings, and his

~~disposition to attribute~~ <sup>disposition to attribute</sup> ~~insistence that~~ Spain's current economic ills and unfavorable inter-

national situation ~~are the result of~~ <sup>to</sup> Soviet enmity and alleged Western

subservience to Soviet aims. They do so out of their deep-seated

fears of change, ~~and because this attitude assuages national pride,~~ <sup>and it</sup>

~~runs~~ <sup>a</sup> in accord with the Spanish predisposition to feel that the world

is "against Spain" and ~~to~~ <sup>a willingness</sup> embrace martyrdom rather than modify a course

of action once undertaken. The Spanish public nevertheless generally

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doubts both the integrity and the technical capacity of the present

government. <sup>Although</sup> While the people would welcome foreign aid to relieve

the national economic distress, <sup>everyone</sup> ~~opinion~~ outside official circles

~~appears to believe~~  
~~unanimously holds that any aid should be given under strict controls~~

~~and supervision if anyone~~ <sup>that no one</sup> outside official circles <sup>would</sup> ~~is to feel its benefit~~

unless it were given under strict supervision.

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**SECRET**III. ECONOMIC FACTORSA. Strategic Exports

Spain produces and has an exportable surplus of a number of raw materials, <sup>None of them is</sup> ~~which are not~~ indispensable to Western Europe, but <sup>all of them</sup> ~~which are~~ marketable in the West and some ~~which are~~ needed by shipped to Eastern Europe would increase the industrial and war potential

~~Spain is the greatest strategic supplier of the Soviet bloc. Two of the most strategic commodities, pyrites and wolfram, are presently needed by the satellite countries (while large quantities of cork are being imported from Portugal into the USSR.)~~

~~Other commodities available in Spain soon may be sought by the Soviet orbit.~~

← The movement of pyrites from Spain to the Soviet satellite countries is currently helping to relieve one of the most critical shortages

in these areas. <sup>The Western Countries could easily afford to buy up</sup> ~~Furthermore, one by the Western nations of all~~

quantities of pyrites exportable from Spain <sup>in view of</sup> ~~is essential in meeting the~~

increased requirements for sulfur and ~~would tend to lessen the drain~~

<sup>US</sup> ~~on the rapidly declining resources of sulfur in the United States.~~

The more critical international situation has led to increased demand for tungsten, and the Soviet Satellites have shown interest in Spanish wolfram, one of the tungsten ores. All of the wolfram available in Spain <sup>could be used by</sup> ~~is critically needed in~~ the US to help build up the inventories of tungsten which, as of 31 July 1950, <sup>amounted to</sup> ~~comprised~~ approximately 33 percent of the stockpile objective.

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Cork is steadily sought by the USSR from Portugal. The additional

quantities which could be obtained from Spain ~~should not be permitted~~  
*could probably be absorbed by Western countries,*  
~~to fall into its hands.~~ If all cork exports from Spain during 1946-49

had been purchased by the US they would have supplied ~~only~~ 36 percent  
 of total US imports of this item during the period.

Large shipments of mercury to the USSR have been reported, but  
~~none~~ of the reports has been confirmed. Additional mercury is not  
 currently needed in the US, inasmuch as the government inventory as of  
 31 July 1950 was 203 percent of the stockpile objective. *Pre-emptive buying*  
~~of the export of mercury from Spain to the East may become necessary,~~  
*might become necessary from a*

*(strategic point of view)*  
*15/18*  
*likely to?*  
~~however, if the demand in Europe increases, *should increase* *respecting the Soviet orbit.*~~

Strontium and mica produced in Spain are too low in quality to  
 be of direct interest to the US, but shortages of these materials may  
 cause the Eastern countries to attempt to procure them from Spain.

Spanish exports of fluorspar, iron ore, and potash contribute  
 to the economies of the Western nations, but there is no indication  
 that these commodities are being shipped to Eastern Europe. The  
 Soviet orbit appears to have an ample supply of fluorspar. The  
 normal trade patterns of iron ore from Spain and Spanish Morocco  
 are not such as to make those ores a likely target for Soviet

~~pre-emptive~~  
 pre-emptive buying. Moreover the USSR is not short of iron ore.

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Similarly the Soviet Bloc is self-sufficient in regard to potash.

The value of products which Spain needs to import greatly exceeds the value of all strategic materials exportable from Spain. The desired imports include wheat, cotton, nitrogenous fertilizer, petroleum products, and capital equipment, including farm machinery. For the most part these products are not available in the East, but could be obtained from the Western nations. Under these circumstances arrangements could be made between Spain and the Western countries whereby the strategic materials would be exported from Spain in exchange for the products needed by Spain. These arrangements might take the form of a network of agreements between Spain and those Western nations which have need for Spain's exportable surpluses. In the case of countries in Western Europe which could supply some of the products urgently required by Spain, the exchange could be effected on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis. To a certain extent this is provided for under Spain's current bilateral agreements, but the pattern has not been established in such a way as to exclude the USSR or offset the inducements to Spain of trade with the Soviet area.

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← B. The Spanish Economy

The Spanish economy is not presently or foreseeably capable of meeting its own peacetime needs in food, raw materials, and industrial commodities, or of satisfying its requirements in transportation and electric power production. An aid program designed to provide basic rehabilitation, rather than temporary relief, for Spain would have to be very substantial in view of the ~~overall~~ economic deterioration which has occurred during the past 15 years, the low level of industrial development, and the depressed state of agriculture, mining, and transportation. Imports of capital equipment would not only have to reach the pre-Civil War average annual level but would have to be scaled so as to compensate for the drastic curtailment of such imports since 1936. It would also be necessary to provide for imports of fertilizer, grain, coal, oil, cotton and other industrial raw materials.

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Thus, to be effective, economic aid to Spain would have to extend over the whole breadth of the economy. The economy cannot be primed as in the case of economies suffering from under-utilization of existing capacity because of a business depression. In Spain available capacity is being utilized except where raw material and power shortages force limitation.

Foreign aid, to be effective, must also be extensive within each area. Aid to agriculture should include investment in fertilizer production, farm and dairy machinery, and extend to land reclamation, soil restoration, and the repair and construction of farm structures. Rehabilitation of the transport system would require import of locomotives, cars and trucks, ties, rails, and road-building machinery at a rate scaled to compensate for years of deficient maintenance of roadbeds, underpasses, switching equipment and rolling stock. Such a program would require at least four years, judging by the experience of ECA with more highly developed economies elsewhere in Western Europe. Even if the Spanish economy were so strengthened, it probably could not contribute anything more than critical minerals to the Western defense, although in quantities perhaps materially greater than at present. No substantial increase in ~~nonmilitary~~ manpower available to Western Europe would be likely.

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The Spanish government moreover, would demand a "price" for the use of its manpower which would probably be expressed in terms of substantial capital imports and consumption goods. Even on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty nations could spare steel, coking coal, machinery, petroleum products, fertilizer, and rolling stock to mend the Spanish economy, the West would find that its demands on the military potential of Spain would be in conflict with the Spaniards' urgent need as well as natural desire to strengthen their economy throughout its length and breadth.

If Spain were used as a base of Western military operations, a huge capital investment program would be unavoidable, as it would be imperative to improve the harbor facilities, airfields, rail and highway transportation systems, prepare storage and supply installations and defensive fortifications, and convert some of Spain's ordnance facilities to handle the repair and rebuilding of American weapons and equipment.

These considerations do not apply to the limited use of certain Spanish naval and/or air bases, if available. Although the costs of constructing these bases might be higher than in alternative theaters, the diversion of economic resources would be small or insignificant compared with the advantages which some of these facilities would offer,

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The costs and problems of rehabilitating the Spanish economy would be very great on several counts: 1) the extensiveness of

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A program for rehabilitating the Spanish economy would ~~not~~ only have to be very broad in scope but, ~~also, it would have to take into account the inefficiency~~ also, if carried out under the present Spanish Government, would ~~also~~ have to take into account the inefficiency and corruption of the administration, which would ~~materially increase~~ greatly increase the cost. *There also would be* and various conflicts with ~~the requirements~~ the requirements of other ~~US programs~~ US programs for raw materials and finished goods in ~~critical~~ short supply,

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industrial output would be less if Spanish manpower were mobilized than if the manpower of any other fully-employed Western nation were mobilized. This is <sup>of the related facts that</sup> ~~not only~~ <sup>highly</sup> because of the lesser industrial development of Spain <sup>is less developed industrially</sup> but also because the productivity of Spanish labor is much lower than that of the other Western countries. The per capita national income -- a rough measure of productivity -- is more than <sup>by</sup> 10 times as great in the US, <sup>(10x)</sup> 5 times as great in the UK, <sup>these</sup> and <sup>1/4</sup> to 1/4 times as great in France, as it is in Spain.

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provided the Spanish quid pro quo were not based on prohibitive demands for general economic aid or territorial irredentism.

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**SECRET**IV. MILITARY FACTORSA. Actual and Potential Capabilities of the Spanish Armed Forces

The effectiveness and readiness of the Spanish Armed Forces to engage in war is negligible defensively/ and non-existent offensively.

The Spanish economy is incapable of completely supplying the Armed Forces with weapons and materiel for peacetime maintenance and training, and could not provide even partial support under war conditions without foreign assistance. Spain has sufficient manpower reserve but

*to utilize large supplies of finished munitions,*

additional training in the use of modern weapons and equipment would be necessary to make it effective.

*no* Spain's ~~military capabilities~~ <sup>production of armaments</sup> could be substantially increased only if foreign assistance were provided in the form of raw materials, and technical aid, weapons patents, industrial machinery, and finished

~~war equipment.~~

Virtually the entire cost of a Spanish war effort, apart from the mobilization, pay, and clothing of its manpower, would have to be borne by the US. It is estimated that to put the Spanish ~~Army~~ <sup>at present</sup> on an effective defense footing would cost from one to two billion dollars. To make ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> a fully offensive force would cost much more.

This estimate is based on a cost of approximately \$3000 per man, as shown in the current US estimate for equipping the Austrian Army, a comparable case to that of Spain in that equipment "from the ground

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up" is required. The cost to the US of undertaking to place the Spanish armed forces on a modern combat footing would embrace ~~re-equipping~~ <sup>the</sup> the army, navy and air force with modern weapons and technical devices, supplying most of the logistical support for training and actual operations, plus an ancillary investment in Spanish arsenals and munition factories. Additional costs to the US would arise from the necessity of sending food supplies to the Spanish population and from the probable diversion of foodstuffs, raw materials, and finished equipment to illegitimate channels, as a result of administrative weaknesses and the corruptibility of the poorly-paid <sup>military and civilian</sup> Spanish officials,

The Spanish economy is not capable of sustaining an increase in its current military effort, which already imposes a heavy burden on the country. In the period 1947-<sup>1950</sup>~~50~~ Spain devoted at least 40 percent of its governmental expenditures to the maintenance of the armed forces. If the national police expenditures and budget disbursements to the Falange are included, almost 50 percent of the budget in the 10 years since the Civil War has been allocated to military and paramilitary purposes.

The Spanish Army has a current strength of 335,000 and is poorly armed and trained. It is estimated that the Army could mobilize, but could not arm or equip, 1,500,000 men (including 1,200,000 trained

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reserves) at the end of a year.

The Spanish Navy has a total personnel of 29,500. It could assist convoy and patrol operations with the small surface force now existing, but these vessels would require radar and sonar equipment. The Spanish Navy has no air arm.

Spain possesses strategically located naval bases. Bilbao and El Ferrol on the Atlantic can service and repair large vessels. The good deep natural harbors of northwestern Spain are useful as operational bases for submarines and patrol craft. Cadiz has a large drydock and shipyards for servicing vessels. Cartagena, on the Mediterranean coast, has good underground storage and shop facilities which can be quickly fitted for war operations. There are large underground fuel storage facilities, and two underground submarine pens that can take four large submarines at one time. The Balearics afford two valuable operational bases, Mahon and Palma (under construction). It is estimated that \$1,000,000 of construction equipment would permit the Spanish to complete work underway on the naval bases, utilizing Spanish manpower. Such items as bulldozers, earth-moving machinery, air drills, etc., are needed.

The Spanish Air Force has no offensive capabilities and its defensive capabilities are practically non-existent. Any improvement

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in its effectiveness would entail its complete rebuilding, requiring extensive foreign assistance in every category. If the obsolete materiel were completely replaced, it would take six months to a year for the Spanish Air Force to familiarize its members with the equipment. The Air Force personnel numbers 35,254. Of this number 1,175 are trained pilots. The principal air fields at Madrid, Barcelona, and Seville are suitable for medium bomber and jet fighter operations. There are air fields located near most of the other principal cities and near seaports in the island possessions and African colonies. Although few of these have permanent runways of sufficient length for sustained operations by combat aircraft, many have hard natural surfaces and are readily extensible.

There is no Early Warning system in Spain or its possessions; only three old pieces of warning equipment exist, and they are inoperative. Visual sighting is accomplished by the Civil Guard, who transmit data to the nearest Air Force headquarters by telephone. No specific directives pertaining to the use of fighters as intercept aircraft exist. Theoretical plans have been evolved, based on the practice of major nations in World War II, but without provision for implementation. As to civil defense, measures taken are very meager even in the large cities. Factory whistles and sirens are the warning media provided

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and air raid shelters are almost non-existent. In Valencia and Barcelona no precautions whatsoever exist, and no practice blackouts or air raid exercises are held.

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**SECRET****B. Spanish Logistic Support**

→ 1. Industry. Spanish industry is vulnerable to aerial bombardment because of the concentration of industrial facilities in a few areas, to interruptions in the supply of fuel and power, and to the curtailment or stoppage of imports of raw materials. In time of war, it would be unable to supply the mobilized armed forces with adequate weapons, ammunitions, and technical equipment.

2. Power and Fuel. Coal production fails to meet domestic requirements by approximately 700,000 tons per year. All petroleum must be imported. Electric power, of which 75 percent is developed by hydroelectric plants, is vulnerable to the fluctuations of climatic conditions as well as to aerial attack.

3. Transportation.

~~the~~ Road The highway system radiates from Madrid to all regions of the country, but there is a paucity of roads connecting the peripheral areas. The total highway system is about 69,000 miles in length, of which is approximately one-third consists of "first-class" roads, that, 17 - 20 feet wide with a macadam or concrete base. The system would not stand up under modern military traffic. There are numerous ~~bottlenecks and~~ obstacles to through traffic on most highways, such as sharp curves, narrow bridges, passage via town centers, <sup>and there are</sup> with few alternative routes available. Roads and bridges generally are in a poor state of repair due to lack of road and bridge building materials and machinery. Motor transport is limited by scarcity of vehicles, gasoline, tires, and spare parts.

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In order to maintain its present ~~fleet~~ of automobiles and trucks, which is inadequate, Spain should import at least 10,000 vehicles a year, but is unable to do so because of lack of foreign exchange. These imports were some 2,000 short in 1949 and for the first six months of 1950 totaled only 556 automobiles and 664 trucks. There is little present prospect of improving this rate of importation.

~~Spain's Railroad~~ The rail system also radiates like the spokes of a wheel from Madrid. It comprises 10,878 miles of railways of which 8,040 are broad gauge (5' 6") and the remainder narrow gauge.

About 1,200 miles of the main lines are double-tracked. The mountainous terrain necessitates numerous tunnels on all lines, as well as sharp curves, frequent and steep gradients, restricting the speed and load of trains and making the railroads particularly vulnerable to air attack or sabotage.

The railway system today cannot handle the ordinary peacetime traffic adequately. Extensive destruction during the Civil War, inability to import replacements during World War II and lack of foreign exchange since have caused serious depletion of engines and

rolling stock.<sup>2</sup> Despite intensive efforts ~~during the past five years~~  
 1 The Spanish standard gauge of 5'6" is the same as that of Portugal but wider than that of France, as well as the US, which is 4'8½".  
 Spanish narrow gauge roads vary but are mainly 3'3 3/8".

2 See table, Appendix D, p.

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to rehabilitate the system, there is a net annual deterioration which

cannot be overcome under present conditions. The domestic railway

is too small and lacks the steel to  
equipment industry cannot meet present peacetime needs because the

~~industry is too small and because of the shortage of steel~~

The movement of troops and materiel into and out of the Spanish side of the Pyrenees is a defense problem which Spain currently is ill-equipped to solve. In 1947, for example, the withdrawal of

60,000 Spanish troops from the Pyrenees required three months' time, and the movement seriously disrupted during which normal railway traffic was largely disrupted by this

~~movement.~~

Among the various deficiencies of communications, the lack of a first-class transverse road at the base of the Pyrenees is conspicuous. The inadequacy of the transverse railway system is indicated by the fact that the current scheduled time for the run of approximately 450 miles from Barcelona to Bilbao (the ports which lie at either end of the Pyrenees) is 18 hours.

4. Harbors and Port Facilities. Spanish commercial ports generally have artificial harbors, poor inland communications and are open to sea attack as well as air bombardment. There are exceptions to this generalization: Bilbao, the heavy industry and shipbuilding center of Spain and Seville are situated inland on

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rivers. The best protected harbors are found in El Ferrol, Cartagena and the inlets of Northwestern Spain.

In recent years Spanish ports have not been used to capacity, and their usefulness would be greatly limited by the present poor transportation system. Construction at naval bases proceeds at a very slow rate due to shortages of materials and electric power and to inadequate and obsolete equipment.

Manpower and harbors are available for expansion of port facilities if inland transportation were improved. The Spanish Navy is working slowly to improve and enlarge its bases, and the ground-work has been laid for expansion which could be accomplished within a reasonably short time with outside help.

5. Communications ~~WA~~ Practically all telecommunications services would be hampered by the destruction of Madrid. International telegraph-telephone service to the Iberian Peninsula would be seriously affected by interruption of service on the two major lines - one along the Atlantic Coast, the other along the Mediterranean Coast - which connect Spain with the rest of Europe via the Pyrenees.

6. Manpower ~~WA~~ <sup>Although</sup> While Spain has adequate manpower resources in terms of numbers, <sup>important</sup> deficiencies exist in terms of highly trained technicians and skilled labor.

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## APPENDIX A

SPANISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES1. Strength and Disposition of Armed Forcesa. Ground Forces

Army	335,000	Peninsular Spain: 243,800
		Spanish Morocco: 60,500
		Spanish Islands: 27,500
		African Colonies: 3,200
Khalifian Army	4,500	Spanish Morocco
		(6 units of Regt size).
Civil Guard	63,000	Bulk of force in Peninsular Spain.
Armed Police	24,000	Bulk of force in Peninsular Spain.

It is estimated that on M-Day 335,000 troops, organized into a core of 18 divisions, would be ready for combat; by <sup>M+180</sup>~~M+100~~, the manpower pool could provide 1,000,000 men, organized into 30 divisions; and by <sup>M+365</sup>~~M+305~~, an estimated 1,500,000 men and 33 divisions could be mobilized. Owing to shortage of materiel, however, these forces could not be equipped except with small arms and light artillery.

b. Navy(1) Combat Vessels

## Present:

Heavy Cruisers (CA)	1
Light Cruisers (CL)	4
Old Light Cruisers (OCL)	1 (inoperative)
Destroyers (DD)	15
Old Destroyers (ODD)	5 (2 inoperative)

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Submarines (SS)	3
Old Submarines (OSS)	2
Gunboats (PG)	9
Old Gunboats (OPG)	3
Minelayers (CM)	6
Minesweepers (AM)	7

Potential:

Six "torpederos" (small DDs) are under construction at El Ferrol and could be completed in a year with assistance. Plans are underway for new destroyers and patrol craft, but completion in the near future is doubtful.

(2) Personnel

Present:

General Service	22,700
Marine Corps	<u>6,800</u>
TOTAL	29,500

It is estimated that the Navy could mobilize approximately 87,000 men in one year's time.

c. Air Force

(1) Aircraft Strength and Disposition

There are 962 aircraft in the Spanish Air Force of which 365 are in tactical units. Most of the aircraft are at least ten years old and the maintenance has been so inadequate that less

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*able to fly. However.*  
(1) than 50 percent are flyable. Of ~~the number~~ *the number*, less than 10 percent are combat operational.

(2) Personnel

There is a total of 35,245 personnel in the Spanish Air Force. Of this number, 1,175 are trained pilots (1,155 officers and 20 enlisted men). It is considered that less than 50 percent of the pilots are qualified by USAF standards. It is estimated that the Air Force could mobilize 100,000 men within one year, including 57,000 reserves.

2. State of Training

a. Army

The general effectiveness and efficiency of the Spanish Army's current training program is poor to fair. Beginning with the conscript class (1949) inducted last March, the training period was reduced from 24 to 15 months, while the quality of training continues to be adversely affected by the following practices and deficiencies: (1) frequent furloughs and holidays; (2) training only in the mornings; (3) laxity of training during the hot summer months; (4) excessive fatigue duty for soldiers; (5) delegation of actual training to the noncommissioned officers; (6) lack of training equipment and weapons; and (7) lack of funds for advanced live-fire small unit training and large-scale maneuvers.

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In general, the training of Spanish officers is fair to good, but it is more theoretical than practical. Junior grade officers receive more training in their arms and services than their ~~United States~~ contemporaries and consequently have some advantage in terms of their supervision of the training of draftees. However, Spanish officer training observed has shown lack of imagination in training methods. Very little effort is made to make training interesting, and since the draftee's educational level is low, much of the effort applied must be lost on him.

b. Navy.

Professional standards are high and the Navy's training program is quite active, although outmoded and hampered by a lack of equipment and fuel oil. Little time is spent at sea and even small-scale maneuvers or war games are rarely held, so that Spanish naval officers, although well grounded in theory, lack practice. The naval academy is modern and does a good job in basic training. Post-graduate specialization is not up to modern standards and is largely theoretical, due to a lack of equipment and knowledge of modern naval developments. The Spanish Naval War College is small and <sup>ineffective</sup> ~~ineffectual~~ in preparing officers for staff work or higher commands.

The quality of Spanish enlisted men is believed to be fair,

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especially that of the volunteers. The draftees, who serve for a period of two years only, are not nearly as good material; <sup>20 percent</sup> ~~are~~ are illiterate and <sup>20 percent</sup> ~~are~~ semi-illiterate. This forces the Navy to concentrate its training program on overcoming illiteracy which limits training in technical skills necessary to operate modern naval vessels.

c. Air Force:

Training of all Air Force personnel is generally very poor because of critical shortages of fuel, aircraft, electronic equipment, training devices, and competent instructors. Most of the enlisted men are conscripts who receive no aviation training whatsoever. Morale is low because of poor pay and equipment. Many commissioned and non-commissioned officers hold additional jobs to supplement their meager pay. There is almost no joint service training and little paratroop work. Most of the tactical training is confined to simple fighter and reconnaissance work. The emphasis given to political indoctrination in the tenets of the present government interferes with the development of professional capacity and undermines real efficiency as does the lack of any cohesion among air force units. Consciousness of being an active member of an effective working organization is absent with the consequent lack of "esprit."

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All Air Force officers attend the General Air Academy, from which they graduate with the rank of second lieutenant. Flying students are then sent to the General Military Academy at Zaragoza, (roughly analogous to the U.S. Military Academy,) for a short course in Army methods, after which they are sent to the General Military Academy at Leon for an additional two years. After 100 hours of flying, students are promoted to first lieutenant and placed on the air promotion list.

In general, training tends to be theoretical rather than practical, condensed; and diffuse rather than objective; such training tends to concentrate on the individual to the detriment of effective teamwork, and on the officer to the exclusion of the enlisted man.

### 3. Morale and Quality of Armed Forces

a. Morale. The morale of the Spanish soldier is fair to good.

Officer morale, in general, is gradually on the downward trend, except for the occasional boosts derived from pay increases or rising hopes for Spain's inclusion among nations receiving United States aid. While over-all morale is not high, an attack on Spain would inspire determined resistance.

b. Physical Condition. The Spanish enlisted man is small of stature, wiry, and tough. Accustomed to a hard and simple life with

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many privations, he is capable of great exertion and of enduring extreme hardship. However, the undernourishment from which nearly all Spaniards have suffered in the past ten years has undoubtedly reduced his stamina.

The physical condition of a large proportion of field grade officers is substandard. Obesity and stomach disorders appear to be fairly common. It is questionable whether many key high ranking officers could withstand the rigors of a difficult campaign. Moreover, many high ranking officers on active duty are in their sixties and appear physically incapable of strenuous work.

c. Educational Level and Technical Qualifications. ~~in~~ <sup>H</sup> The

standard of education of the conscript group is low. It is estimated that: (1) only two to four percent of Spanish youth receive a university education; (2) about 67 to 70 percent have had only two to five years of schooling; and (3) 10 to 20 percent are illiterate. A competent ~~United States~~ <sup>U.S.</sup> observer has estimated that the educational level of the general run of Spanish troops is not above that of the average 12-year-old American.

About 25 percent of the regular ~~Army~~ <sup>army</sup> officers have been commissioned from civil life or the ranks following the Civil War and

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and despite notable exceptions, are generally older and lack the educational qualifications of the other officers. Formerly, many of these officers were non-commissioned officers who, though capable and efficient for lower commands, are unsuited for higher commands or staff assignments. Officers who are graduates of the General Military Academy possess good mental qualifications. <sup>best</sup> The ~~most~~ <sup>from a professional point of</sup> professionally qualified officers, however, are among the graduates of the General Staff School.

Naval officers are generally alert and read available literature on naval operations of World War II, but they lack practical knowledge of the techniques and equipment developed since 1939. Too little time is spent at sea for thorough training of men and officers alike. The men are generally good sailors, but are not trained in the use of modern equipment.

d. Leadership Abilities of Officers. <sup>1</sup> Although the Spanish have demonstrated on many occasions their personal courage, there appears to be a lack of perseverance of purpose in many officers. They form part of a privileged class with a <sup>heavy</sup> ~~heavy~~ vested interest in the political life of the country. As allies they are prone to promise more than they can deliver. As commanders they are likely <sup>be</sup> to deficient <sup>1</sup> in detailed advance preparations, in coordination of effort between units, and to be improvident in the use of materiel and manpower.

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They take little interest in the welfare or training of their men and neglect proper maintenance of equipment. Inadequate pay compels many officers to devote at least half of their time to civilian jobs, but their faults are also due to traditional attitudes. Inadequacy of planning, mistakes of calculation and failure to support troops with supplies have been recurrent in Spain's military history. The officers have a strong tendency to disdain routine, to ignore unpleasant deficiencies, to rely on faith and improvisation, and to expect advancement and awards through favoritism above merit. In the small unit actions of the Moroccan and Civil War campaigns, a premium was placed on rash personal acts of courage rather than upon planning, <sup>good</sup> care of men and materiel. In World War II, the record of the Spanish Blue Division was not impressive.)

Spanish Naval officers are good leaders. Although strict, they are tolerant with the enlisted men and are good instructors. The enlisted men have respect and an almost blind faith in the officers, and carry out commands unquestioningly.

<sup>orig</sup> e. Willingness to Accept Command or Supervision of Foreigners  
and to Fight Outside Spain <sup>4</sup> Because of the Spaniard's nationalistic traditions, foreign leadership probably would not be successful below the divisional level, <sup>but</sup> ~~while~~ the amount of supervision to which the

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Spaniard would submit is unknown. It has been reported that the commander of the Blue Division refused to withdraw when ordered to do so by the German High Command.

If so directed by the Government, it is believed that Naval officers would not hesitate to follow British or American leadership and would carry out orders of any high command under which they were placed, but that they would be less enthusiastic about being under Portuguese, Italian, or French command.

#### 4. Weapons and Equipment (C)

##### a. Army \*

~~Present~~ Spanish weapons and equipment are varied as to calibers, types, quality, and efficiency; most are obsolete, non-standardized, and poorly maintained. Some items are usable and could be effective in the hands of well-trained troops. This is particularly applicable to types undergoing standardization now. Ammunition and demolition explosives reserves are low; stocks on hand would last the Army at its present strength a maximum of four weeks.

b. Needs, Present and Potential (C) A great weakness in Spanish weapons and equipment is lack of balance. For example, fairly adequate and effective rifles and pistols are in the hands of the troops and in stock, while there are practically no effective <sup>anti tank</sup> ~~antitank~~ and anti-

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are as follows:

(1) Infantry

~~(a) Small arms~~ The 7.92-mm Mausser bolt-action rifle

is a good infantry weapon. Forty-five percent of the troops, mostly in the Pyrenees and northern Spain, are estimated to be armed with this rifle. The remainder of the troops are armed with a 7-mm Mausser bolt-action rifle which also is a good weapon. There are adequate numbers in stock of the 7-mm rifle for mobilization but re-equipping of the Army with the 7.92-mm rifle is going forward. The Army has a good pistol in adequate supply, and a good submachine gun copied from the German Schneider. The Army is converting from the old Hotchkiss light machine gun and other heterogeneous types to a good Czechoslovak automatic rifle (the ZB-26) and the Czech ZB-37 heavy machine gun. These are all fairly modern and effective weapons, but only a few have been delivered to the troops and it will take some time before sufficient numbers can be manufactured to equip the Army.

~~(b) Antitank weapons~~ The Spanish Army's antitank

defense is extremely weak. The majority of antitank guns in the hands of the troops are 45-mm and 47-mm of heterogeneous makes (Italian, Soviet, Spanish, and Czechoslovak) of Civil War vintage. These weapons have only training value. A 60-mm antitank gun is under production and

is reasonably effective, but it is too light in caliber and only a small

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number have been produced. A proposed 75-mm antitank gun will not be produced in its present form. Approximately 1,000 60-mm bazookas of Spanish design have been made, but production has been stopped and one of larger caliber is under study.

(e) ~~Infantry Howitzer~~ <sup>①</sup> The 75-mm infantry howitzer is a fairly good weapon, but only a limited number have been produced.

(d) ~~Infantry Mortars~~ <sup>①</sup> The Spanish 81-mm and 50-mm mortars are reasonably effective and it is reported that there are sufficient quantities for mobilization. The new 120-mm Franco mortar is <sup>a</sup> rather clumsy weapon, which cannot be considered an organic infantry division weapon.

← (2) ~~Artillery~~ <sup>①</sup> <sup>U</sup> Artillery weapons consist of a heterogeneous collection of pieces which with few exceptions are of obsolete design. The artillery standardization program is one of expediency, but will result in usable and fairly effective weapons when completed. The Army is standardizing on the following divisional, corps, and army reserve artillery weapons:

(a) ~~Divisional Artillery~~ <sup>①</sup> 105-mm Pack Howitzer, 105-mm Reinoso Howitzer, M1943 and 105-mm Howitzer (a remodeled 105-mm Vickers Howitzer, M1922).

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(b) <sup>The</sup> Corps Artillery 149-mm Howitzer (converted

from 155-mm Howitzer Schneider) ~~this weapon~~ is to be used until

the 149-mm Howitzer (experimental) is in production. One pilot

model of the latter weapon is being tested. <sup>The</sup> 105-mm gun (Krupp) ~~this~~

~~gun~~ is on the drawing board, but will become the Corps Artillery gun.

In the interim, the Soviet 122-mm gun is being used.

(c) <sup>Recently</sup> Army Reserve Artillery ~~Recently~~ Production

was started on a 150-mm gun based on a German piece. One battery has been manufactured. The 305-mm Howitzer (Italian) is an ungainly siege piece of very limited use. Other heterogeneous calibers and types of artillery exist, but are only in use for training and as stopgap weapons, pending production of the above pieces.

(d) According to the latest USAF information the AAA of the Spanish Armed Forces is composed of five AAA Regiments, three independent AAA Battalions, ten AAA Batteries (attached to the Army Artillery Regiments) and five Marine AAA Batteries. These units are equipped with a variety of pre-World War II equipment and are in general poorly trained. Spanish ~~antiaircraft~~ artillery is incapable of effecting an adequate defense.

(3) <sup>4</sup> Cavalry ~~The~~ status of cavalry weapons and

equipment is somewhat similar to that of the infantry.

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(4) Armor <sup>44</sup> Spanish armored equipment, which is obsolete

and very limited in quantity, is of no use except for training. The Army is reported to have about 22 German Pz Kw IV's, and about 12 75-mm assault guns on the German Pz Kw IV chassis. The Chief of Staff of the Armored Division stated recently that the Army is having great difficulty ~~and~~ in keeping these vehicles running.

(5) Other Equipment <sup>21</sup> The Army is critically short of

motor transportation, and depends almost entirely on animal transport. There is a dearth of adequate engineering, signal, and quartermaster equipment.

b. Navy

a. Present

The Spanish Navy has only conventional naval weapons of pre-World War II design and its vessels use visual fire control. Guns for naval vessels are manufactured in Spain.

b. Needs, Present and Potential

Sonar and navigational and fire control radar are required in order to use Spanish naval vessels effectively.

Construction machinery and equipment is needed to complete naval base construction at Cartagena, El Ferrol and in the Balearic Islands.

Machine tools and servicing equipment would have to be provided to

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service modern warships, the amount depending upon the use to be made of the bases.

To utilize Spanish naval potential, DEs and/or DDs should be furnished to replace obsolete cruisers and DDs. Approximately 12 DEs or DDs could be manned with present personnel and 36 <sup>should be added</sup> within one year. Machinery and auxiliary equipment are needed to complete six small DDs under construction, ~~and~~ which are ready for launching if material were available to complete them.

C. Air Force:

The Air Force has no first-line aircraft. Present models are a heterogenous collection of obsolete designs, largely German, Italian and Soviet. Efforts are being made to standardize types and to secure new equipment but only slow progress can be made because of the inadequacy of domestic production and the lack of foreign exchange for imports. Spare parts, fuel and communications equipment are inadequate for operations at present strength. So far as is known, the Air Force possesses no radar equipment. There are approximately 35 Spanish-owned commercial planes and a number of light commercial utility planes.

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## TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

1. Spanish Railroad Rolling Stock

<u>Year</u>	<u>Steam Locomotives</u>	<u>Freight Cars</u>	<u>Passenger Cars</u>
1935	3,075	99,124	6,488
1948	2,700	69,332	2,758
1949	2,650	68,224	2,586

Much of the rolling stock currently in use is old and worn out.

RENFE, the state system which handles 90 percent of freight, estimated in 1948 that 35 percent of its steam locomotives were more than 45 years old. Because of the age and poor condition of freight cars average load capacity has been reduced from a pre-Civil War average of 10 metric tons per car to about one-half that amount.

The normal annual depreciation of crossties on the RENFE system is estimated at  $2\frac{1}{3}$  million per year; however, only 1,529,000 ties were laid in 1948 and 1,060,000 in 1947. Similarly, rail replacement has not kept pace with normal requirements. The ever-worsening condition of equipment and road-bed is reflected in the increase in the number of accidents to a rate about 10 times that in the US.

The continued operation of the system under these handicaps is due in large measure to experienced and resourceful management. The cost of putting the Spanish railway system in condition for normal,

efficient and economical operation has been estimated at between 90 and 200 million dollars.

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← 2. Telecommunications \*

The landline telephone network (mostly open-wire construction) is the most important telecommunications system in Spain. It was built by an American company and is maintained along <sup>US</sup> ~~United States~~ technical lines because of the influence of I/T.&T/ which owned and operated a large percentage of this network prior to 1945. Limited support to military operations could be derived from this system.

The telegraph system, which is owned and operated by the government, is in poor condition. Although this system is extensive, with approximately 2,683 telegraph offices, the equipment is obsolete and would be of little value in support of military operations.

There is apparently no domestic radio network for civil traffic although the police have a few stations. The airways have radio at all class A airfields. This radio equipment includes beacons, D/F and control sets.

The broadcasting system is privately owned and operated, but controlled by the government, which has licensed approximately (60) <sup>medium wave</sup> stations to broadcast. There is no ~~nationwide~~ hook<sup>up</sup>, but Radio Madrid S.A. owns stations in six major cities.

The railroads have their own telecommunications network. This <sup>which</sup> is a Western Electric system and operates on a "selective call" scheme.

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Madrid is the most important telecommunications center for all services. Long distance telephone lines radiate from this center to the coastal cities. However, there are approximately 6,000 toll lines (channels) in Spain, and this system is fed at each urban center. Although 350 of those channels radiate from Madrid along six main routes, there is no single point at which the entire system can be disrupted.

There are two important international telegraph-telephone routes to France across the Pyrenees: One route through Cerone and the other through Irun. Interruption of these lines would seriously hamper service to the Iberian Peninsula.

International cables connect Spain with France, Italy, Portugal, Wales, the Balearic Islands, and Spanish Morocco. There are two telephone circuits to Gibraltar and nine to Portugal crossing the frontier at four separate points.

International radio furnishes radiophone and radio telegraph service to Rome, New York, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Venezuela, Morocco, London, Bern, Mexico City, Manila, the Balearic and Canary Islands.

There is only limited local production capacity for telecommunications equipment, mainly in the Madrid area. This production is inadequate for normal repair service. Within the military services, the equipment is obsolete, the supply inadequate and technical training is inferior compared to United States standards.

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STRATEGIC MATERIALS

Resources of many critical materials required for war production exist in Spain, some in appreciable quantities and others in relatively insignificant amounts. Extraction of strategic minerals is hampered by worn-out machinery, poor transportation, and scarcities of trained labor.

Spain has the largest known reserves (estimated at 500 million tons) of pyrites and is normally the world's principal producer although its relative importance has declined considerably since 1929. In that year Spain accounted for 49.2 percent of world production (excluding the USSR) while in 1948 it accounted for 15.4 percent. In 1949 over 1.1 million metric tons were produced of which 1 million tons were exported. This has been the general level of production and export since World War II.

Spain has the largest known reserves of mercury in the world (about 1 million flasks). Current production is at the rate of 4,000 flasks per month but the industry is capable of doubling this output.

Spain is the second most important producer of wolfram in Europe, although its production has never exceeded more than ~~7~~ percent of world production. Actual production varies with world demand. The highest yearly output attained by Spain was approximately 4,000 in 1943. At that time much of the ore concentrates were sold fraudently, that is,

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represented as containing 65 percent tungsten trioxide ( $WO_3$ ) when the content in reality was 15 to 20 percent. It is believed that maximum Spanish productive capacity of high grade wolfram concentrates (60 percent or more  $WO_3$ ) is not above 2000 metric tons per year.

Although not a major world producer, Spain has considerable reserves of relatively high-grade iron ore. (One estimate places reserves in peninsular Spain at 250 million metric tons plus 400 million tons of low grade. High grade reserves in Spanish Morocco are estimated at 80 million tons. The production level for the past four years has been about 2.5 million tons annually, of which approximately one-third is mined in Spanish Morocco. Current annual domestic requirements are about 1.6 million tons. It is believed that, given adequate power and labor, production could be greatly increased (possibly doubled) but that to equal or surpass the 1929 level of 6.5 million tons the industry would require a sizeable investment in modern mechanical equipment.

Spain produces copper, tin, zinc, lead, and manganese largely for home consumption, but deposits of these minerals are adequate for further exploitation.

Spain produces about ~~5~~ percent of known world output of potash.

There are no estimates of total reserves which are, however, believed

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to be appreciable. Maximum production of crude and finished salts to date was reached in 1948 with 993,000 metric tons containing 151,000 tons of potash,  $K_2O$ .

Spanish production of fluorspar varies with demand. Maximum productive capacity is estimated at 50,000 <sup>to</sup> 60,000 metric tons of commercial grades annually. Probable reserves are believed to be relatively limited.

Spanish production of cork normally accounts for between 20 and 25 percent of world production. It is expected that raw cork production in Spain during the next few years will average around 50,000 metric tons per year.

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